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A DIFFERENT VOICING OF UNWELCOMENESS:
RELATIONAL REASONING AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
MARGARET MOORE JACKSON*
I. INDICATING CONDUCT WAS UNWELCOME-A DIVERGENCE
OF EXPECTATION FROM REALITY
In workplace sexual harassment law, the notion that a claim must be
based on "unwelcome" conduct has been elevated from an unremarkable,
undefined term in the administrative guidelines' to the essence of a sexual
harassment claim. 2 In pursuing such a claim under Title VII,3 an employee
must formally prove that the complained-of conduct was unwelcome. 4 The
victim of the harassment can establish unwelcomeness by testifying that
she 5 did not want to be treated in the manner that she was treated at work. 6
Yet, instead of inquiring whether the harasser's conduct was appropriate for
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law; J.D., University of
San Francisco, 1992; B.A., University of North Carolina, 1988. Acknowledgment and thanks to
Matthew Schmidt for research assistance and to the University of North Dakota School of Law for
the award of a summer research grant supporting this article.
1. Discrimination Because of Sex Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 Fed.
Reg. 74677 (November 10, 1980) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1981)) (providing the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guideline that harassing conduct was
required to be "unwelcome"). Since first recognizing sexual harassment as actionable, courts have
treated these Guidelines as a "working definition" of sexual harassment and required the
complained-of conduct to be unwelcome. Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)welcome Conduct and the
Sexually Hostile Environment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 733, 745-46 (2002).
2. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a)
(1985)) (stating that "[tihe gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual
advances were 'unwelcome."'). Gravamen is defined as "[t]he part of a charge or an accusation
that weighs most substantially against the accused." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 767 (4th ed. 2000). The word is derived from the Latin words "gravare" (to
burden) and "gravis" (heavy). Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-4 (2000).
4. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68-69.
5. Although men are also subject to sexual harassment at work, most often the employee
being harassed is a woman and the harasser is a man. See Heather Antecol & Deborah Cobb-
Clark, The Changing Nature of Employment-Related Sexual Harassment: Evidence From the U.S.
Federal Government, 1978-1994, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 443, 443-45 (2004) (citing studies
concluding that half of all women experience sexual harassment at some point during their
working lives). Over 90 percent of reported cases involve men harassing women. DEBORAH L.
RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX, THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY 97 (1997).
6. Payton v. Receivables Outsourcing, Inc., 163 Ohio St. 3d 722, 2005 Ohio 4978, 840
N.E.2d 236, 241, at 55 9-10 (holding that plaintiffs deposition testimony satisfies requirement of
prima facie evidence of unwelcomeness on summary judgment motion).
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workplace interactions, 7 this element shifts the focus to the plaintiff's
conduct. The finder of fact is asked to determine how the plaintiff really
felt about the complained-of conduct, based on her behavior.8 By conduct-
ing this inquiry as to plaintiff's behavior, the legal system discounts the
assertion of the plaintiff that she didn't want sexual attention at work, and
instead examines her conduct for signs that she actually provoked or
positively reinforced the advance. 9 The questions being asked are dis-
turbingly familiar- whether she asked for it and whether she enjoyed it. 10
The woman facing sexual harassment at work must navigate a dilemma
between moral obligations and self-interest."I She works to pursue not only
income, but also dignity and self-respect.12 Sexual harassment interferes
with these pursuits, while creating a situation where her own conduct is
loaded with sexual, economic, and ethical implications. The woman's deci-
sions about whether to report the harassment and how to interact with the
harasser may adversely impact the social status, reputation, income, and job
security of both her and the harasser. 13 Particularly when a legal claim is
made, the manner in which the woman handles the conflict is assessed in
the context of moral decision-making.' 4 Her participation in sexually-
7. Given the power dynamics and financial imperatives of work, some have questioned
whether workplace sexual overtures can ever truly be welcome. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43
STAN. L. REV. 813, 831 (1991) (responding to justifications of the unwelcomeness requirement by
positing that "there is no such thing as truly 'welcome' sex between a male boss and a female
employee who needs her job").
8. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68-69 (holding that "the correct inquiry is whether respondent by
her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome ...." and discussing the
admission of evidence as to "whether [plaintiff] found particular sexual advances unwelcome").
9. Louise F. Fitzgerald, Who Says?, Legal and Psychological Constructions of Women's
Resistance to Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 94, 95
(Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) ("The critical inquiry rarely focuses on
whether the conduct was unwelcome; rather, courts routinely scrutinize the woman's behavior for
clues to whether the behavior was welcome.").
10. See Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 794 (1986) (discussing the notion that
common law rules admitting evidence of rape victims' sexual history and conduct allowed defense
attorneys to insinuate that the victim asked for or enjoyed the rape).
11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 4, 14-17
(1999). Posner defines morality as "the set of duties to others," animals, and God, meant to inhibit
our self-centered or emotionally-driven impulses to act. Id. at 4. Moral obligations are impacted
in deciding whether it is always wrong to lie; whether infanticide, sex discrimination, prostitution,
euthanasia, affirmative action, surrogate motherhood, or eating meat are immoral; and whether
fairness requires compensation for an accidental injuries. Id. at 14-15.
12. Ronald Turner, Title VII and the Inequality-Enhancing Effects of the Bisexual and Equal
Opportunity Harasser Defenses, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 341, 344 (2005).
13. Note, Notice in Hostile Environment Discrimination Law, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1977,
1986-87 (1999).
14. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 147 (Harvard Univ. Press 1993) (1982) (stating that "[i]n a world that
extends through an elaborate network of relationships, the fact that someone is hurt affects
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related activities, both at and away from work, become matters to be
judged. If she "welcomed" the conduct, as the legal system interprets wel-
comeness, her efforts to obtain compensation are deemed unethical and
unfair, and on that basis are precluded.15
Professor Gilligan delineated two distinct approaches that people use to
identify and resolve moral dilemmas: 16 one relying on an understanding of
responsibilities and relationships to harmonize conflicting obligations (rela-
tional reasoning); the other relying upon a prioritization of rights and rules
to determine fairness (rights-based reasoning).17 Gilligan and other femi-
nists have argued that women tend to make decisions using the first system,
dubbed the "ethic of care," rather than the second system, which is known
as the "ethic of rights."18 Thus, a woman using the ethic of care will make
choices based upon the way she perceives that she should in light of her
relationships and responsibilities.19 Ethic of care decisions tend to differ
from those that would be made by a person with an orientation toward an
ethic of rights.20
Decisions about how to handle the moral dilemmas raised by a sexually
harassing situation in the workplace take on a special significance during
the unwelcomeness inquiry. Legal analysis of whether conduct was unwel-
come is guided by assumptions about how women ought to behave if they
everyone who is involved, complicating the morality of any decisions and removing the
possibility of a clear or simple solution."). The adversarial legal system virtually mandates an
outcome that distinguishes winners from losers, those who are rewarded from those who are
penalized. Id.
15. See Maria L. Oliveros, Fictionalizing Harassment-Disclosing the Truth, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 1373, 1392-93 (1995) (stating that the EEOC's proposed unwelcomeness requirement is
meant to preclude parties to consensual relationships from punishing one another on the basis of
false accusations, and to prevent abuse of sexual harassment claims by women who desire sex
without being held responsible for it); Hartsall v. Duplex Products, Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 774 n.7
(4th Cir. 1997) ("She cannot now cry 'foul' for conduct that was, at the time, not 'unwelcome."').
16. See GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at xix, 147 (describing moral problems as "problems of
human relations."). Moral problems occur in situations involving conflicts where, no matter what
the decision, someone either is not served or is hurt. Id. at 147.
17. Id. at 19, 105.
18. Id. at 2, 160-65; Robin L. West, The Differences in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 83-89 (1987)
[hereinafter, Hedonic]; Robin L. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988)
[hereinafter, Jurisprudence].
19. GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at 105, 160.
20. Id. at 62-63. The hierarchical view of relationships typically articulated by men contrasts
with the web of connections described by women, not only conveying different modes for
structuring relationships, but also correlating with different ways of viewing morality and self,
"different modes of action[,] and different ways of assessing the consequences of choice." Id. at
62.
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do not want to invite sexual conduct at work. 21 In many instances, these
expectations are at odds with the way in which women who report being
sexually harassed in the workplace actually behave. 22 An explanation for
this incongruity is that legal precedents for interpreting unwelcomeness are
founded in rights-based reasoning, such that they are uniquely ill-suited to
interpret the behavior of women who navigate their lives using relational
reasoning. This point provides an additional criticism of the much-
beleaguered unwelcomeness requirement. 23
The use of generalized expectations and interpretations of behavior to
derive meaning is not unique to sexual harassment law or to the legal sys-
tem.24 However, the purpose of laws designed to affect behavior is apt to
be thwarted when such laws rely upon flawed behavioral models.25 The
statute underlying sexual harassment prohibitions was designed to eliminate
discrimination in the workplace, including the unequal treatment of
women. 26 Where the legal standards governing sexual harassment are
based upon misguided behavioral expectations, the impact extends beyond
substantial unfairness to plaintiffs and threatens the underlying goals of
equal employment opportunity law.
21. See Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 96 (criticizing unwelcomeness framework for supporting
assumption that women who do not welcome sexual conduct universally behave in certain ways,
regardless of context).
22. See, e.g., id. at 100-01 (noting that formal reporting of sexual harassment is considered
strong legal evidence of unwelcomeness, despite numerous studies indicating that women are
unlikely to formally report sexual harassment).
23. See, e.g., Paul Nicholas Monnin, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of
Sexual History in Sexual Harassment Claims Under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of
Evidence 412, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1155, 1167 n.49 (1995) (noting criticisms of the unwelcomeness
requirement as an aberration of Title VII litigation reflecting bias grounded in sexual stereotypes
and arguing that the burden should shift to the defendant to prove plaintiff wanted the sexual
conduct at work); Steven L. Wellborn, Taking Discrimination Seriously: Oncale and the Fare of
Exceptionalism in Sexual Harassment Law, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 677, 694-95 (1999)
(describing the focus on the victim's conduct in establishing unwelcomeness as an anomaly in
anti-discrimination law).
24. See Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 405, 415 n.21 (2005) (quoting STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN
DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 1 (2002)) (stating that "[elveryone has a theory of human nature.
Everyone has to anticipate the behavior of others, and that means we all need theories about what
makes people tick. A tacit theory of human nature-that behavior is caused by thoughts and
feelings-is embedded in the very way we think about people. We fill out this theory by
introspecting on our own minds and assuming that our fellows are like ourselves, and by watching
people's behavior and filing away generalizations.").
25. See id. at 415-16.
26. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that Congress intended
to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification."); Erickson
v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1269, 1274 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (stating that the
purpose of Title VII is to eliminate discrimination in employment and to provide women with
equal treatment in the workplace).
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Sexual harassment in employment has been recognized as a common
experience for working women, 27 with negative effects for both the women
and their employers. 28 The resulting costs to society are huge, measured in
psychological, sociological, and financial terms. 29 Current law stumbles in
its attempt to alleviate these harms, imposing rights-oriented assumptions
upon the behavior of women. 30 Some women do not make decisions based
upon their rights, but rather, upon the anticipated impact those decisions
have upon their relationships. When a harassment victim negotiates moral
dilemmas using relational reasoning, instead of following the expectations
of a rights-based system of reasoning, her behavior is prone to being
misconstrued and her claim that the sexual conduct was unwelcome is like-
ly to be rejected. For women who use relational reasoning, the unwel-
comeness requirement fails to accurately assess what it purports to
measure-whether the subject of the sexual harassment solicited or invited
the conduct. This divergence of expectation from reality inhibits efforts to
eliminate sexual discrimination and harassment in the workplace.
The requirement that sexual harassment plaintiffs establish that the
complained-of conduct was unwelcome has been harshly and repeatedly
criticized as unfair to plaintiffs, and therefore, to women.3 1 However, the
intersection between relational reasoning and the unwelcomeness require-
ment has not previously been explored. A structural bias in the law, dis-
favoring women, is revealed by examining how the analysis of unwelcome-
ness impacts persons who navigate their lives using an ethic of care. 32
27. See RHODE, supra note 5, at 99 (stating that over 50 percent of all women are subjected
to harassment at work or school).
28. See Antecol & Cobb-Clark, supra note 5, at 443-45 (providing that sexual harassment
results in turnover, absenteeism, decreased job satisfaction, reduced productivity, and negative
health consequences for employees and significant financial costs for employers, even apart from
any costs for legal defense of sexual harassment claims).
29. RHODE, supra note 5, at 101. Rhode references the economic and psychic injuries
suffered by harassment victims, namely "job dismissals, transfers, coworker hostility, anxiety,
depression, and other stress-related conditions." Id. at 101. Sexual harassment also contributes to
the perpetuation of sexist stereotyping and workplace gender segregation, and decreases employee
productivity and longevity. Id.
30. Moreover, assumptions about the range of proper behavioral decisions by women (in the
workplace) are embedded in the unwelcomeness inquiry. For instance, the United States Supreme
Court has concluded that the clothing decisions of a woman are part of this analysis. See Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (holding that evidence of a plaintiff's "sexually
provocative dress or speech" are "obviously relevant"). These and other assumptions are based on
stereotypes that overlook or contradict the actual bases for decisions made by women. See
Christina A. Bull, The Implications of Admitting Evidence of a Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs
Speech and Dress in the Aftermath of Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 41 UCLA L. REV. 117, 144-
48 (1993).
31. See Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 104.
32. See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Out of the Shadows: Traversing the Imaginary
of Sameness, Difference, and Relationalism-A Human Rights Proposal, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J.
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When sexual harassment plaintiffs, the majority of whom are women, rely
upon relational reasoning to resolve moral dilemmas, the rights-based
unwelcomeness construct places them at a distinct disadvantage. Until this
burden is removed, sexual harassment law cannot effectively achieve its
goal of eliminating this type of discrimination in the workplace.
II. BURDENING THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT VICTIM
The requirement that plaintiff prove the conduct was unwelcome, like
the prohibition against workplace sexual harassment, was not established
through the enactment of any statute. Rather, it was developed through
application of administrative guidelines and case law interpreting Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.33
The actual language of Title VII broadly forbids sex-based discrimi-
nation by an employer against an employee. 34 The drafters apparently did
not consider whether on-the-job harassment would constitute discrimination
under Title VII.35 The statute does not inquire as to whether the employee
through her own conduct somehow welcomed the unequal treatment and
does not require the employee to affirmatively demonstrate that the em-
ployer was not invited to discriminate.36
111, 120 n.51 (2002) (quoting MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY 2, 15(1999)) (noting that underlying structural bias in the law can be uncovered by
analyzing how supposedly neutral rules or law actually impact and disadvantage women).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-4 (2000).
34. See id. An employer that fails to hire, refuses to hire, discharges, or otherwise discrim-
inates against a person with respect to her "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment" because of that person's sex has committed an unlawful employment practice. Id. §
2000e-2(1). The wording of the statute prohibits actions that limit, segregate, or classify em-
ployees or applicants in ways that tend to deprive them of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect their status as employees because of sex, among other prohibited bases. Id. §
2000e-2(2). Job discrimination based upon race, color, religion, or national origin is prohibited as
well. Id. § 2000e-2(1)-(2).
35. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of
Employers for Sexual Harassment, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 99 (1995).
The legislative history evidences no discussion of whether a person's terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment included a right to be free from improper harass-
ment. Rather, the congressional debates focused on discrimination in hiring and
compensation and the racial segregation of workers common at that point in our
nation's history.
Id.
36. The unwelcomeness requirement does not even have an approximate correlate in other
areas of anti-discrimination law. Discrimination cannot be made legal by consent of the victim.
See Wellborn, supra note 23, at 694-95 (noting that when the harasser's conduct is discriminatory
but not unwelcome, the effect is to provide a defense of consent that is not available in any other
type of discrimination action). Nor may equal employment rights be prospectively waived.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974); Cole v. Burns Intern. Sec. Services,
105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
[VOL. 81:739
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Judicial interpretation of Title VII developed two strains of illegal sex-
based conduct: intentional actions or policies that treat women differently
than men with respect to employment-related matters ("disparate treat-
ment") and ostensibly neutral practices that disadvantage one gender more
than the other ("disparate impact"). 37 An employee asserting illegal dis-
crimination under either theory need not demonstrate that the discrimination
was unwelcome.
When workplace harassment began to be recognized as a form of
actionable discrimination, sexual harassment was one of the last types to be
established. 38 On-the-job harassment was first held to be actionable dispa-
rate treatment in a race discrimination case,39 wherein the creation of a
work environment that was hostile or abusive toward a protected class was
found to constitute discrimination forbidden by Title VII.40 Viable harass-
ment claims also were recognized in the context of religious and national
origin harassment. 4 1 Whether the victim of the harassment had invited or
37. See Ramit Mizrahi, "Hostility to the Presence of Women": Why Women Undermine Each
Other in the Workplace and the Consequences for Title VII, 113 YALE L.J. 1579, 1580 (2004).
Disparate treatment and disparate impact theories also apply to workplace discrimination based on
race, color, religion, and national origin. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 (1977); Bryant v. Bell At. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 133 n.5 (4th Cir. 2002); Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 80-81 (1977); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S.
86, 92 (1973).
38. See Tory L. Lucas, Disabling Complexity: The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
and Its Interaction with Other Federal Law, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 871, 918 (2005) (citing
Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1106 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that the ADA
prohibits harassment on the basis of disability)). Disability-based harassment was recognized after
sexual harassment, with disability discrimination itself not being established as illegal under
federal law until passage of The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Id.
39. Mizrahi, supra note 37, at 1580-81 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
1971)). "Hostile work environment claims initially emerged as a variation of disparate treatment,
as courts established that workers could be subject to intentional discrimination even when their
employers did not take tangible job actions against them." Id. See Rhonda M. Reaves, One of
These Things is Not Like the Other: Analogizing Ageism to Racism in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 839, 889 (2004) (discussing hostile work environment);
Oppenheimer, supra note 35, at 101 (stating that Rogers was the first reported appellate decision
to address workplace harassment and in that decision the Fifth Circuit adopted the EEOC's
position that employers have a duty to prevent workplace harassment).
40. Mizrahi, supra note 37, at 1580-81 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.
1971)). "The circuit court found that the employer had violated Title VII, despite the fact that no
tangible job action was taken, because 'the phrase terms, conditions, or privileges of employment'
in [Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of
creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination." Id. See
Reaves, supra note 39, at 889 (stating that "[t]he court reasoned that employees should not be
singled out by race to experience a different and less comfortable working environment than that
experienced by workers of other races").
41. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (citing Compston v. Borden, Inc.,
424 F. Supp. 157, 162-63 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568
F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977)).
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solicited the conduct was not at issue, because racial, religious, and natural
origin harassment were assumed to be inherently unwelcome.
4 2
Initial efforts to apply the prohibition against workplace harassment to
sexual conduct were deemed not covered by Title VII.43 Although by the
mid-1970s, it was legally well-accepted that employees should not have to
endure harassing behavior based upon their race or religion, sex-based
harassment in the workplace was considered a natural44 phenomenon
involving mere personal proclivities,4 5 which should not affect the
employer46 or the plaintiff's employment.4 7
42. See Monnin, supra note 23, at 1167 n.49 (showing the presumption that harassment
based on race, religion, and national origin is inherently unwelcome led to the much earlier
development of hostile work environment theories for these forms of employment discrimination);
Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
to be "Severe of Pervasive" Discriminates Among "Terms and Conditions" of Employment, 62
MD. L. REV. 85, 95 (2003) (showing that national origin guidelines did not require proof of
unwelcomeness on the assumption that such harassment would always be unwelcome); Terry
Morehead Dworkin & Ellen R. Peirce, Is Religious Harassment "More Equal? ", 26 SETON HALL
L. REV. 44, 61-62 (1995) (providing that courts generally do not require plaintiffs to prove
unwelcomeness in cases of harassment based on religion, race, or national origin). But see, e.g.,
Jones v. Kroger, Inc., No. Civ.A. 504-543-JMH, 2005 WL 2807194, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 27,
2005); Campbell v. Univ. of Akron, No. 5:04 CV 2505, 2005 WL 2805854, at *15 (N.D. Ohio
Oct. 26, 2005); Mosby v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:04-0275, 2005 WL 2600420, at
*15 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 13, 2005) (incorporating the element of unwelcome conduct into more
recent racial harassment cases).
43. See Oppenheimer, supra note 35, at 110-11 (describing cases in the early 1970s where
federal courts rejected efforts to articulate sexual harassment claims as outside the scope of Title
VII).
44. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236. (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1979) (stating that "[iut is conceivable, under plaintiff's theory, that flirtations of the
smallest order would give rise to liability"). The Miller court continued by stating that "[tihe
attraction of males to females and females to males is a natural sex phenomenon and it is probable
that this attraction plays at least a subtle part in most personnel decisions. Such being the case, it
would seem wise for the Courts to refrain from delving into these matters .... " Id. See also
Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 557 (D. N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d
1044 (3d Cir. 1977). The Tomkins court explained:
This natural sexual attraction can be subtle. If the plaintiffs view were to prevail, no
superior could, prudently, attempt to open a social dialogue with any subordinate of
either sex. An invitation to dinner could become an invitation to a federal lawsuit if a
once harmonious relationship turned sour at some later time. And if an inebriated ap-
proach by a supervisor to a subordinate at the office Christmas party could form the
basis of a federal lawsuit for sex discrimination if a promotion or a raise is later denied
to the subordinate, we would need 4,000 federal trial judges instead of some 400.
Id.
45. See Come v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated,
562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that "[M]r. Price's conduct appears to be nothing more than a
personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism. By his alleged sexual advances, Mr. Price was
satisfying a personal urge").
46. See id. at 163-64 (refusing to recognize workplace sexual harassment because it would
mean "a potential federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented
advances toward another. The only sure way an employer could avoid such charges would be to
have employees who were asexual").
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As a result of efforts to heighten awareness of the harmful aspects of
sexual harassment,4 8 eventually courts began to hold that conditioning the
benefits of employment upon acquiescence to sexual demands violated Title
VII. 49 Unlike harassment based upon race or other protected charac-
teristics, workplace sexual harassment was recognized only where the
employee suffered the loss of a tangible job benefit.5 0 By the end of the
1970s, four appellate court circuits had recognized this conduct as "quid pro
quo" sexual harassment.51 However, the elements of a claim were not
clearly delineated and unwelcome conduct was not highlighted as a
particularly important aspect.52
47. Barnes v. Train, No. 1828-73, 1974 WL 10628, at *1, (D. D.C. Aug. 9, 1974), rev'd sub
nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The first Barnes court stated that
[t]he substance of plaintiff's complaint is that she was discriminated against, not
because she was a woman, but because she refused to engage in a sexual affair with
her supervisor. This is a controversy underpinned by the subtleties of an inharmo-
nious personal relationship. Regardless of how inexcusable the conduct of plaintiff's
supervisor might have been, it does not evidence an arbitrary barrier to continued
employment based on plaintiff's sex.
Id.
48. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN (1979) (discussing sexual harassment and credited with aiding in the establishment of
workplace sex harassment as a cause of action under Title VII). See also Rebecca K. Lee, Pink,
White, and Blue: Class Assumptions in the Judicial Interpretations of Title VII Hostile
Environment Sex Harassment, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 677, 711-12 (2005) (citing MacKinnon's
work); Jennifer Ann Drobac, Sex and the Workplace: "Consenting" Adolescents and a Conflict of
Laws, 79 WASH. L. REV. 471, 503-04 (2004) (providing that MacKinnon articulated the social
harm of workplace sexual harassment); Robert A. Kearney, The Unintended Hostile Environment:
Mapping the Limits of Sexual Harassment Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 87, 87 (2004)
(stating that sexual harassment scholarship "began largely in the academic library of'
MacKinnon).
49. See, e.g., Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 659-61 (D. D.C. 1976) (holding that
discharge in retaliation for refusal to submit to sexual demands violates Title VH).
50. Because these situations involve the granting or withholding of job benefits depending on
the employee's response to sexual overtures, this theory of harassment is known as "quid pro
quo," Latin for "something for something." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. 2004); see
also Martin J. Katz, Reconsidering Attraction in Sexual Harassment, 79 IND. L. J. 101, 115-16
(2004) ("Quid pro quo harassment occurs when a supervisor (or someone else in a position of
power) makes an unwelcome request to engage in sexual relations with the target, and where the
request is accompanied by an express or implied threat.").
51. Oppenheimer, supra note 35, at 112. The District of Columbia, Third, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits accepted claims involving sexual demands of supervisors by late 1979. Id.
52. Of the four appellate opinions that first recognized sexual harassment as actionable, only
the D.C. Circuit's addressed unwelcomeness, and these remarks did not establish it as part of
plaintiff's prima facie case. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
(MacKinnon, J., concurring). Judge MacKinnon stated:
Where sexual advances are involved, it must be candidly recognized at the outset that,
even when directed from a supervisor who would be difficult to refuse, the advances
themselves might be welcome. It cannot be presumed as a matter of law that the
employee is subjected to disfavorable treatment because of the advances. Once it is
established, however, that the employee has no interest in the proposal, then the
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Next, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
established Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex. 53 The Guidelines
not only recognized sexual quid pro quo harassment, but also hostile envi-
ronment harassment,54 stating that sexual harassment includes "[u]nwel-
come sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature ...."55 The Guidelines specify that
these types of behaviors constitute sexual harassment "when (1) submission
to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of
an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct
by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unrea-
sonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 56 The require-
ment that the conduct be "unwelcome" was not explained or emphasized as
a particularly significant component of the claim. Justification for the use
of the term "unwelcome" in the definition of sex-based harassment, which
was not required for other types of employment discrimination claims, 57
was based upon the assertion that sometimes people seek or invite sexual
conduct in the workplace.58
Finally, based in part on the articulation of sexual harassment in the
Guidelines,59 the analysis of hostile environment racial harassment as work-
place discrimination was appropriated successfully into the sexual harass-
employee may suffer from the continuation of advances. And the eventual damage to
her job for failing to accede, if that is a result, is undeniably harmful.
Id. This comment connected the requirement that conduct be unwelcome with the presumption
that only unwelcome advances could cause harm. See also Chambers, supra note 1, at 733
(stating that the requirement that sexual harassment be based on unwelcome conduct "rests on the
notion that welcome conduct does not cause sexual harassment harm").
53. 45 Fed. Reg. 74677 (Nov. 10, 1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1981)).
54. See Linda Kelly Hill, The Feminist Misspeak of Sexual Harassment, 57 FLA. L. REV.
133, 186 (2005) (stating that Professor Catharine MacKinnon first delineated the quid pro
quo/hostile environment harassment distinction).
55. 45 Fed. Reg. 74677 (November 10, 1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1981)).
56. Id.
57. See Monnin, supra note 23, at 1167 n.49; Johnson, supra note 42, at 95; Dworkin &
Peirce, supra note 42, at 61-62.
58. Janine Benedet, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims and the Unwelcome
Influence of Rape Law, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 125, 159 (1995) (mentioning that the EEOC
defended inclusion of unwelcomeness in prima facie cases by arguing that the same conduct may
constitute either harassment or enjoyable sexual activity).
59. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986) ("Since the Guidelines were
issued, courts have uniformly held, and we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title
VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environ-
ment.").
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ment context. 60 The element of unwelcome conduct was recited along with
the Guidelines, but was not analyzed or defined in the early cases
recognizing the claim. 6' Eventually, the Supreme Court also held that
hostile work environment sexual harassment constitutes actionable discrim-
ination under Title VII.62 The disparate treatment theory was recognized as
encompassing both quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment
claims.
63
Where Title VII was never amended to specifically include sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination, case law developed a definition
by building on the EEOC Guidelines. 64 The requirement of "unwelcome"
60. See Mizrahi, supra note 37, at 1581 n.9 (discussing the first case to recognize hostile
work environment sexual harassment claim). That case was Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,
943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981), where the employer was held to have discriminated based on sex in
violation of Title VII by creating or condoning a "substantially discriminatory work environment,
regardless of whether the complaining employees lost any tangible job benefits." Id. See also
Oppenheimer, supra note 35, at 120-21 (discussing Bundy and Title VII). Bundy and other
subsequent opinions noted the parallels between racial and sexual harassment. See Mizrahi, supra
note 37, at 1581 (discussing hostile environment sexual harassment as similar to racial harassment
as a barrier to workplace equality). Not all commentators are sanguine about the analytical
connection between racial and sexual harassment analysis. See Reaves, supra note 39, at 890
n.236 (quoting Camille Hebert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 819, 820 (1997)). "[Flor some courts, the use of analogies between racial and
sexual harassment, rather than causing them to recognize the seriousness of sexual harassment,
may in fact have caused them to take claims of racial harassment less seriously." Id.
61. Neither Rogers nor Bundy considered whether the conduct at issue in those cases was
unwelcome. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d
934, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
62. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
63. See id. at 64-65, 73 (recognizing hostile environment sexual harassment in addition to
quid pro quo sexual harassment). Some believe that the distinction between the two types of
sexual harassment claims has now been eliminated. See Mosher v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 240
F.3d 662, 666 (2001) (citing Ellerth and Faragher for the proposition that the Supreme Court has
abandoned the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment, instead
categorizing cases as either involving a tangible employment action taken by a supervisor or not).
This lack of distinction focuses the inquiry on whether or not an employer will be held vicariously
liable for the actions of supervisory employees, rather than upon whether or not harassment has
occurred in a legal sense. See Chambers, supra note 1, at 740 (stating that the sole difference is
that quid pro quo harassment causes a tangible job detriment while hostile work environment does
not). Other courts continue to observe the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment harassment. See Bolin v. Okla. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 397 F. Supp. 2d
1293, 1301 (N.D. Okla. 2005) (discussing types of workplace sexual harassment). The Bolin
court stated that "[w]orkplace sexual harassment may take either of two forms: (1) 'hostile work
environment' harassment, which consists of offensive gender-based conduct that is severe or
pervasive; or (2) 'quid pro quo' harassment, which occurs when submission to sexual conduct is
made a condition of concrete employment benefits." Id. See also Ferrell v. Harvard Indus., Inc.,
No. CIV.A. 00-2707, 2001 WL 1301461, at *4, *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2001) (discussing distinction
between quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims).
64. Francis Achampong, The Evolution of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Law: A Critical
Examination of the Latest Developments in Workplace Sexual Harassment Litigation, 73 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 701, 714-15 (1999). Achampong wrote that:
Courts have incorporated the EEOC's definition of sexual harassment in fashioning
the elements of a prima facie case in both types of sexual harassment. In quid pro quo
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conduct became a well-established component of a plaintiff's prima facie
case, but without a clear definition of what "unwelcome" meant or how it
should be proved. 65 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the
issue in 1982, discussing unwelcomeness in a sentence that continues to be
relied upon: "In order to constitute harassment, this conduct must be un-
welcome in the sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the
sense that the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive."66
The Supreme Court added that the inquiry should focus on whether "her
conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome," not
whether any participation by her in the sexual conduct was voluntary. 67
The Court made clear that the unwelcomeness element could not be
rebutted by a showing of consent and that consent is no defense to a sexual
harassment claim itself.68 The existence or absence of unwelcome conduct
requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances. 69 However, the
courts tend to concentrate on the woman's conduct and its interpretation,
rather than other specific components of the circumstances. 70
sexual harassment, the plaintiff must establish that he was a member of a protected
group, that the unwelcome sexual conduct was based on sex, that employment condi-
tions were affected by the victim's response, and that the employer was liable. In hos-
tile environment sexual harassment, the victim must establish membership in a pro-
tected group, unwelcome sexual conduct based on sex, and an effect on employment
conditions.
Id.
65. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing the
Guidelines in enunciating the elements of hostile environment sexual harassment). These ele-
ments have been refined over time, but without clarifying the unwelcome conduct requirement.
See, e.g., Amanda Jarrells Mullins & Richard A. Bales, Employer Liability for Emotional Distress
Arising From Investigation f a Title VII Harassment Complaint, 23 QUNNIPIAC L. REV. 1027,
1030 (2005) (setting forth four elements required to prevail on Title VII hostile work environment
claims, based on recent Supreme Court cases).
66. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903. This prescription was left undisturbed by the Meritor Court
and remains frequently cited and quoted. See, e.g., Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 143 F.3d 1103,
1108 (8th Cir. 1998); Kruger v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., No. 5:04-CV-91, 2005 WL
2417658, *4 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2005); Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d
590, 608, (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2, 1989) (adopting requirements for a prima facie claim of
environmental sexual harassment set out in Henson).
67. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (describing the relevant inquiry as "determining whether
[plaintiff] found particular sexual advances unwelcome"). There continues to be confusion as to
whether the conduct must have been perceived as unwelcome from the perspective of the plaintiff
or from the perspective of the harasser. See L. Camille Hebert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual
Harassment: Does Motive Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 341, 375-77 (2005) (noting the confusion
as to whether perceived conduct is determined from the plaintiff's or the harasser's perspective).
68. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68-69. See Drobac, supra note 48, at 490 (explaining that "acqui-
escence to sex is not consent [that refutes a claim of sexual harassment] .... The plaintiff must
prove only that she somehow indicated that the sexual behavior was unwelcome.").
69. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69.
70. Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 103-04 (noting that despite the totality of the circumstances
standard, "courts too often focus mainly on the woman's behavior, interpreting it in a particular
way and ignoring other, equally or more likely, meanings").
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Beyond these rather broad holdings, a cohesive definition of unwel-
come conduct has not developed.71 Five Supreme Court sexual harassment
cases have been decided since Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,72 but none
of them further refined the analysis of when conduct is unwelcome.
7 3
States have generally followed the lead of federal courts, ultimately enact-
ing similar sexual harassment prohibitions and referring to federal case law
in interpreting them. 74 Without exception, establishing unwelcome conduct
is a required element of a plaintiff's prima facie case. 75
Although the lack of clear guidance for determining when conduct is
unwelcome has resulted in inconsistent case law, certain principles have
been established for interpreting whether a plaintiff's behavior welcomed
the complained-of conduct. These principles, which are described below in
Part IV, anticipate particular rights-based behaviors from victims of harass-
ment to validate claims that sexual conduct was unwelcome to them.
Behavior that falls outside of these rules or requires an understanding of the
plaintiff's context tends to be considered welcoming. Thus, when a harass-
ment victim negotiates moral dilemmas using relational reasoning, instead
of conforming to rights-based expectations, her behavior is prone to being
misconstrued. As a result, her assertion of unwelcome conduct is likely to
be rejected, defeating her sexual harassment claim.
71. See Chambers, supra note 1, at 751 ("Though courts seem to have a general sense of
what the unwelcomeness inquiry entails, they have been spare in enunciating unwelcomeness
principles."); Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 95 ("This seemingly obvious and innocuous descriptor
has, unfortunately, turned out to be neither.").
72. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
73. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998) (establishing standards
for vicarious liability); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755-65 (1998) (discussing
vicarious liability); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (holding that
same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22
(1993) (holding that harassing behavior must be both subjectively and objectively offensive, and
that courts must consider the totality of the circumstances in making this determination); Pa. State
Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 152 (2004) (holding that constructive discharge may violate Title
VII and that the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defenses are still available where there is no
underlying official act).
74. See, e.g., Wyerick v. Bayou Steel Corp., 887 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that
because the Louisiana anti-discrimination statute is similar to Title VII, Louisiana state courts
consult the federal statute to interpret their close questions); Falczynski v. Amoco Oil Co., 533
N.W.2d 226, 230 n.2 (Iowa 1995) (discussing similarities between Iowa code and federal law);
Opp. v. Source One Mgmt., Inc., 591 N.W.2d 101, 105 (N.D. 1989) (stating that because NDHRA
provisions parallel Title VII, North Dakota courts will look to federal interpretations of Title VII
for guidance when such interpretations are helpful and sensible to follow).
75. Drobac, supra note 48, at 490 (stating that "[e]very state FEPS that similarly prohibits
sex discrimination and sexual harassment also makes 'unwelcomeness' an element of the prima
facie case").
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III. RELATIONAL REASONING-DECISIONS GROUNDED IN
CONNECTION AND INCLUSION
Relational feminist theory recognizes a distinction between persons
who make moral choices by identifying and prioritizing abstract rights and
those who make choices by emphasizing connections with and responsi-
bilities to others. 76 Professor Gilligan's well-known work, In a Different
Voice, critiqued the ostensibly gender-neutral models used to assess the
development of moral identity and judgment, concluding that they were
based on male-centered values and perspectives. 77
Her work distinguished relational reasoning, which attempts to
"harmonize the concerns" of everyone involved in a dilemma, from rights-
oriented reasoning, which analyzes situations by prioritizing abstract
rights. 78 When there are conflicts between people, relational reasoners rely
upon the specific nature of the relationships to guide a resolution.79 Rights-
based thinkers apply formalistic rules to the situation, without considering
context. 80 This theory recognizes two distinct ways of approaching moral
problems: "Whereas the logic of justice celebrates qualities like autonomy,
equality, universalizability, and rights, the ethic of care celebrates the
somewhat opposite qualities of connectedness, responsiveness to need,
contextualization, and duty." 8'
Reliance on the ethic of care is associated with women, because while
a percentage of both sexes was found to use combinations of relational and
rights-oriented reasoning, the persons who were identified as using solely
relational reasoning were all women. 82 Gilligan's study indicated that fe-
males more often place significance on relational issues and the specific
context of the decision to be made, while males more often rely upon ab-
76. GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at 1; West, Hedonic, supra note 18, at 83-89; West,
Jurisprudence, supra note 18, at 4.
77. See GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at 21-22.
78. See Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism,
Abortion Rights, and The Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 858, 866 (1993) (discussing
an example in Gilligan's study). To depict the difference, Gilligan describes the different manner
in which a boy and a girl responded when asked to resolve the same moral quandary: should a
man without money to buy a drug necessary to save his wife's life steal to obtain it? Id. The boy
in the study views the situation in terms of a conflict between the right to life and the right to
property, one of which is superior. Id. He observes that the question seems like a math problem
with people. Id. The girl in the study instead attempts to address a lack of human connection in
the hypothetical by suggesting alternative solutions, which avoid elevating one person's rights at
the expense of the other's. Id.
79. Id. at 867.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 886.
82. Id. at 869-70 (citing Carol Gilligan, Moral Orientation and Moral Development, in
WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 19, 25 (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987)).
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stract notions of autonomy and individual rights. 83 She and other scholars
have theorized that men tend to focus on "abstract analysis, formal rights,
and competitive structures," while women tend to emphasize "social con-
text, caring relationships, and cooperative interaction. " 84 Gilligan noted
that "morality is seen by these women as arising from the experience of
connection and conceived as a problem of inclusion rather than one of
balancing claims."
85
The genesis of the relational emphasis more often found among women
is sometimes attributed to women's traditional roles as mothers and
caregivers, which are thought to establish deep emotional and physical con-
nections with others.86 These responsibilities to others are believed to coin-
cide with the development of social support networks, which in turn
enhance the perceived value of fulfilling such responsibilities and in main-
taining the support received from others.87 Women arrive at the ethic of
care after moving through two prior stages of development: the concern for
survival/selfishness and the focus on goodness/responsibility. 88 At the third
and final stage, the ethic of care is reached by incorporating the self as
among the interconnected persons that one should avoid harming, disman-
tling the notion that caring for the self connotes selfishness.89
Moral decision-making based upon care, connection, and context is
attributed to the "feminine voice," but persons of either sex can function
with these so-called "feminine" qualities. 90 Gilligan argues that, for both
genders, the optimal integration of principles and context when making
public and professional decisions "is inhibited by a mix of psychological
and cultural forces." 9 1 Thus, both genders suppress and reject relational
83. GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at 21-22.
84. RHODE, supra note 5, at 37.
85. GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at 160.
86. See, e.g., Phoebe A. Morgan, Risking Relationships: Understanding the Litigation
Chances of Sexually Harassed Women, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 67, 70-71 (1999); West, Hedonic,
supra note 18, at 140; West, Jurisprudence, supra note 18, at 3.
87. Morgan, supra note 86, at 71.
88. GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at 64-85, 128-50.
89. GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at 128-50, 138.
90. See Gretchen R. Reevy & Christina Maslach, Use of Social Support: Gender and
Personality Differences, 44 SEx ROLES 437, 439 (2001) (explaining that although sex and gender
are highly correlated, persons of both sexes are understood to potentially have both masculine and
feminine qualities). One author argues that in a way, police officers who decide not to arrest a
domestic violence perpetrator because he is married to the victim are using relational reasoning
that considers the context of the situation. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in
Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2160-61 (1995) (noting that court officials use the
"female voice" by considering relationships, caretaking, and responsibility when deciding whether
crimes should be prosecuted and what the penalty should be).
91. Peggy Cooper Davis & Carol Gilligan, A Woman Decides: Justice O'Connor and Due
Process Rights of Choice, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 895, 896 n.8 (2001). Davis and Gilligan argue
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reasoning as they grow toward adulthood, but women are believed to do so
to a lesser degree.92 Gilligan's examination of these concepts is a bedrock
of relational feminist theory, "one of the most prominent and widely
accepted varieties of feminist theory."
93
IV. EXPECTING RIGHTS-BASED DECISION-MAKING FROM
RELATIONAL REASONERS
According to relational feminist theory, women are more likely than
men to rely exclusively upon relational reasoning.94 Women are also more
likely to encounter sexual harassment at work.95 The unwelcomeness re-
quirement disadvantages those sexual harassment plaintiffs who resolve
problems using the ethic of care (i.e., women) by failing to recognize their
behavior as evidence of unwelcomeness.
Despite the lip service given to context, 96 sexual harassment law
developed certain formalistic rules to guide interpretation of whether al-
legedly harassing conduct was welcome or unwelcome. 97 As discussed
that a strength of Justice O'Connor was her ability to use a combination of rule-based and context-
based reasoning when making legal decisions. Id. at 896. Others have faulted Justice O'Connor's
reliance on case-specific context as reflecting inconsistency and a "role as straddler extra-
ordinaire .... " See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Grim Fairy Tales, THE NATION, March 28, 2005,
available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050328/williams. Some argue that "rights-based"
and "care-based" ethics are so oppositional to one another that they cannot be integrated. Ann C.
Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1383 (1986).
92. Davis & Gilligan, supra note 91, at 898.
93. Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 78, at 858. The authors cite to a large body of scholarly work
developing and building on relational feminist ideas. Id. at 859 n.6. Relational feminism also has
its critics. Id. at 858-59 n.4, 860 n.10. Some critics assert that the impact of factors such as race,
class, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, power, and social status are overlooked by gender
difference theorists. See RHODE, supra note 5, at 38 (citing various authors writing on factors
such as race, class, age, or ethnicity).
94. See supra Part mI (discussing relational reasoning).
95. See Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies and Procedures,
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, May 1991, at 497 (stating that workplace sexual harassment "is a
hazard faced much more frequently by women than men").
96. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (noting that the totality of the
circumstances must be examined); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20 (1993) (examining
the totality of circumstances approach).
97. Until Title VII was amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to provide for a right to a
jury trial, judges were making findings of fact in sexual harassment cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a
(2000). Judges, who by necessity are also lawyers, are more likely to employ a rights-based
reasoning and to expect it in others. Law school is believed to establish and/or reaffirm the justice
orientation over an ethic of care. Susan Daicoff, Making Law Therapeutic for Lawyers: Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence, Preventative Law, and the Psychology of Lawyers, 5 PSCYHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 811, 832 (1999). Legal problem solving and decision-making are taught as rule-based
activities, distinct from relational reasoning. Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. the
Case Method: A Marvelous Adventure in which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, 34 CAL.
W. L. REV. 351, 353, 355 (1998). Studies indicate that most male law students and male lawyers
favor a rights or justice-based orientation in making moral decisions. Daicoff, supra note 97, at
831-33.
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below, these rules reinforce assumptions about how women would (or
should) behave when they do not welcome sexual overtures or abusive
conduct in the workplace. Both social science and the facts of reported
cases indicate that many women do not act according to these formalistic
rules before or after encountering conduct they consider unwelcome or
situations they perceive as sexually harassing. The basis for this incom-
patibility between the law's expectations and the actual conduct of many
women may be explained in terms of the two distinct foundations for moral
judgment identified by Gilligan. The standards for evaluating a workplace
situation for signs that sexual conduct was unwelcome anticipate certain
rights-based behavior by the complaining employee. Because the standards
for interpreting welcomeness rely upon an "ethic of rights" (rights-based
reasoning) and expect the victim of harassment to respond with rights-
oriented behavior, women who tend to rely upon an "ethic of care"
(relational reasoning) and consider relational implications in deciding how
to act are likely to have their conduct misinterpreted as welcoming sexual
harassment.
A. THE TIMELY, FORMAL COMPLAINT-WHY DIDN'T SHE
COMPLAIN ABOUT IT?
Initially, it seemed that the target of the harassment was not required to
object, protest, or complain in order to establish that she did not welcome
particular conduct.98 However, many decisions have affirmed the principle
that if a woman does not welcome the conduct, she will assert her right to a
harassment-free workplace by complaining about it.99 Moreover, she is
expected to complain within a relatively short amount of time after harass-
ing conduct occurs.100 The rule imposes the additional assumption that if
conduct is truly unwelcome, the complaint will be made in a direct manner,
98. See EEOC POLICY STATEMENT No. N-915-050 (March 19, 1990) (providing that a
timely complaint is not necessary to establish unwelcome conduct).
99. See Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 100-01 ("making a formal complaint appears to be the
legal sine qua non of an 'appropriate' response"); Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 632
(8th Cir. 2000) (finding that when plaintiff failed to complain about the conduct, it was not
determined to be unwelcome).
100. Paraohao v. Bankers Club, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (finding
that conduct was not unwelcome as a matter of law in part because the plaintiff did not complain
until nearly four months after she started working with the harasser); Weinsheimer v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1990), aff'd., 949 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1991)
(finding that conduct was not unwelcome where reported months afterwards); Vermett v. Hough,
627 F. Supp. 587, 608 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (holding that a three month delay in reporting did not
support actionable harassment).
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using formal procedures.lO' Merely mentioning sexually harassing inci-
dents to supervisors during discussions about overall workplace problems
will not necessarily indicate that conduct was unwelcome, especially if the
complainant does not convey outward distress about them. 02 Complaining
solely to co-workers is similarly inadequate. 103 Failure to complain, com-
plaining long after the harassing events have occurred, or raising the issue
in an indirect manner are thus considered evidence that the conduct was
welcome.
However, studies indicate that women who experience what they
regard as unwelcome workplace sexual harassment often do not report it at
all, much less near the time when it occurs. 104 Women are more likely to
tolerate or avoid sexual harassment than they are to object to it.105 This
reluctance to complain about harassment is borne out by studies indicating
that only a small percentage of women who feel they have experienced un-
welcome sexual harassment at work decide to initiate formal claims. 06
Such women may quietly document what has occurred, but will not neces-
sarily take any further action. 107 The small percentage of women who
ultimately do report workplace problems are more likely than men to toler-
ate the behavior for some length of time before finally resorting to formal
action. 108
101. See, e.g., Paraohao, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (determining that conduct was not
unwelcome in part because complaint was made informally, to a co-worker, and that initial, more
formal discussions with management left out certain details); Weinsheimer, 754 F. Supp. at 1564
(providing that conduct was not unwelcome in part because plaintiff reported harassment in casual
conversation with supervisor); Kouri v. Liberian Servs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-00582-A, 1991 WL
50003, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 125, 127-28 (E.D. Va. Feb. 6, 1991) (noting that plaintiff failed
to report harassment through formal channels).
102. Weinsheimer, 754 F. Supp. at 1561, 1564. The Weinsheimer court focused on the fact
that plaintiff delayed reporting the harassment and then did so in informal conversations with
supervisors without appearing troubled. Id. at 1564.
103. See Magrum v. Republic Indus., Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1241, 1252 (N.D. Ga.
2003).
104. Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees' Rights Consciousness and the
Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 L. & SoC'Y REV. 83, 86 (2005) (citing a number
of authors and studies on the issue).
105. See, e.g., James E. Gruber & Michael D. Smith, Women's Responses to Sexual
Harassment: A Multivariate Analysis, 17 BASIC APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 543, 544-46 (1995)
(citing studies showing that few women respond assertively to or formally report harassment, but
instead use various strategies for tolerating the harassment; when it becomes intolerable, women
quit their jobs).
106. See Morgan, supra note 86, at 68 (citing surveys conducted by the U.S. Merit Systems
Protection Board in 1981, 1988, and 1994 showing that 42 percent to 44 percent of female federal
employees report legally actionable conduct, while only 7 percent file formal claims).
107. Marshall, supra note 104, at 105-15.
108. See Elizabeth A. Hoffmann, Dispute Resolution in a Worker Cooperative: Formal
Procedures and Procedural Justice, 39 L. & SOC'Y REV. 51, 70 (2005) (finding that for women,
toleration was perceived as the foremost alternative to using the formal grievance procedures at a
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Women decide to delay or refrain from reporting the harassment based
upon the nature of their relationships, including the relationship between
themselves and the harasser.109 The desire to avoid harming either their
relationships or other people extends throughout their perceived web of
connections. For example, women may refrain from reporting harassment
because they are hesitant to cause trouble for the harasser and his family. 110
The focus on relationships includes an examination of the relationship the
woman has with her employer and supervisors. Instead of automatically as-
serting their rights, many women gage the relations they have with manage-
ment and distinguish between formal rights they have and relationships and
benefits that actually can be protected. "I
Rather than complaining through formal channels, women rely upon
social support networks, such as friends and family members, to cope with
the conduct they are enduring at work."12 These relationships provide com-
fort, and also sometimes warn against taking any action to object." 3 The
absence of supportive relationships inside the workplace may be an addi-
tional cause of women refraining from complaining about or reporting ha-
rassment. Women who lack access or insider status perceive informal
discussions with co-workers or supervisors about a problem as an option
not available to them. 114
worker cooperative, while men most often anticipated using informal negotiations and discussions
to resolve job-related problems).
109. See Morgan, supra note 86, at 71 (citing William L. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and
Austin Sarat, Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..., 15 L.
& SOC'Y REV. 631, 654 (1981)) (stating that character and depth of the relationship between
disputing parties shape the options that litigants choose to consider and the actions they take).
110. See Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Extent of Sexual Harassment in
Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. OF VOCATIONAL BEHAVIOR 152, 162 (1988) (stating that
female university students failed to report sexual harassment because, among other reasons, they
did not want to cause trouble or be labeled as a troublemaker); Gruber & Smith, supra note 105, at
557-59 (stating that "women may fear that assertive responses will unduly harm the harasser").
111. Marshall, supra note 104, at 99; Patricia A. Gwartney-Gibbs & Denise H. Lach,
Sociological Explanations for Failure to Seek Sexual Harassment Remedies, 9 MEDIATION Q.,
365, 367-68 (1992).
112. See Marshall, supra note 104, at 114 (stating that co-workers can often provide
emotional support for a complaining party, but also can remind them of the costs of the
complaint); Gruber & Smith, supra note 105, at 545 (noting that studies indicate that women are
more likely to discuss harassment with a friend or coworker than to report through formal
channels and that defusion (masking and social support) is a strategy women use for dealing with
sexual harassment).
113. Marshall, supra note 104, at 114. A woman participating in Marshall's study reported
how her trusted female colleagues advised that if she wanted to succeed, she had to "learn to deal
with it" and "suck it up" to avoid retaliation. Id.
114. See Hoffmann, supra note 108, at 63-64, 70 (concluding that even in the flattened
hierarchical realm of a worker cooperative, significant differences existed in the ways in which
men and women anticipated resolving workplace problems).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Women who fail to report harassment in a timely and direct manner are
mindful of the potential effects such reporting would have on their relation-
ships and the possible harm that would be caused to others. This focus
mirrors the overriding concern for relationships and responsibilities that
Gilligan and other psychologists have identified as tending to exist in
women who make judgments using the ethic of care.115 As they assume
responsibility for and sensitivity toward the needs of others, women
consider perspectives other than their own in deciding whether to report
harassment.1l6 Women reflect upon the potential social costs of reporting
and the effects on their own responsibilities to others.117 Even when
reporting the harassment, women may do so while attempting to maintain
their connections and relationships with co-workers, even including the
harasser."t 8 In doing so, women generally approach moral conflict from a
premise of connectedness and a desire to solve the conflict without hurting
anyone."19 An additional explanation for ignoring or avoiding the harasser,
rather than reporting him, is that the woman feels morally tied to the
feminine ideal of self-sacrifice, and therefore, is reluctant to consider, much
less give priority to, her own needs. 120
Such perspectives are antithetical to the law's justice-oriented
assumptions which expect a woman to view her right to work without being
harassed as predominating other rights, including any held by the harasser
or his family. The law prioritizes the right to be free of sexual harassment
in the abstract, assuming that a person who is being harassed will stand up
for her formal rights without considering context. This standard also im-
ports a balancing of her rights with the "right" of the employer to be placed
on notice of harassment.121 The legal standards tend to penalize a woman
115. See GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at 16-17, 22.
116. See id. at 16-17.
117. See id. at 21 (articulating a moral dilemma for a woman who uses relational reasoning
as how "to lead a moral life which includes obligations to myself and my family and people in
general").
118. See infra Part IV.B. (discussing the rules guiding interpretation of the harassment
victim's conduct toward her harasser).
119. See CAROL GILLIGAN, FROM IN A DIFFERENT VOICE TO THE BIRTH OF PLEASURE 2
(Vintage Books 2003) (stating that women started with the premise of connectedness rather than
separateness); GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at 64-65 (noting the desire of some women to solve
conflicts without hurting others).
120. See GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at 82, 128-50 (discussing "the morality of self-sacrifice"
in the transitional second stage of female psychological development, and explaining that women
have a difficult time choosing to act in their own self-interest when doing so might harm someone
else, categorizing such conduct as selfish).
121. See Chambers, supra note 1, at 748 (criticizing potential justification for unwelcome-
ness requirement-that employer must be on notice that conduct is unwelcome for employer to be
responsible for sexual harassment harm).
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who balances inter-relational concerns in an attempt to harmonize the rela-
tionships involved. Employees who decide to protect their position and
maintain their acceptance in the workplace social network by refraining
from reporting harassment are often deemed to have welcomed the
conduct.122
A divergence exists between how women who have been harassed tend
to behave, and how the law expects them to behave in order to establish that
the conduct was unwelcome. This divergence reveals the disconnect be-
tween the law's abstract, rule-based standards and the ethic of care used by
many women to resolve moral dilemmas. Courts often fail to recognize the
significance of relational concerns that may influence a plaintiff's handling
of sexual harassment. For example, Marilyn Labra was subjected to sexual
revelations, inquiries, and propositions from her boss during a three-year
period before she finally resigned from her employment.123 Her boss, the
owner and president of the company she worked for, was also her cousin.124
Her concerns in deciding how to respond to the harassment included fearing
the loss of her job, needing to support her family, not wanting to have to
obtain another job further from her home, and hoping that she could help
her boss obtain counseling. 25 In addition, her husband also worked for the
same company. 126
When she brought suit for sexual harassment,127 the trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendant, finding that Labra had failed to show
that the conduct was unwelcome.128 The trial court found it significant that
Labra had not complained about the behavior until after she learned that
defendant was going to either lay off or reassign her husband.129 The
appellate court reversed, finding that a reasonable jury could still determine
that the conduct was unwelcome. 30 However, even on appeal, the court
focused strictly on the instances where Labra told her employer "to stop the
122. See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing the plaintiffs
"receptiveness" to sexually suggestive jokes).
123. Labra v. Mid-Plains Constr., Inc., 90 P.3d 954, 956-57 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004).
124. Id. at 956.
125. Id. at 956, 958. These concerns echo the theory that women focus on survival, then
goodness, then reach an ethic of care. Id.
126. Id. at 956.
127. Id. at 956. Suit was brought pursuant to the Kansas Act Against Discrimination. Id. at
956-57; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1001 (1993) (providing the statement of purpose of the
act). The interpretation and application of the Kansas Act Against Discrimination use federal
cases construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as persuasive authority.
128. Labra, 90 P.3d at 957.
129. Id. at 957-59.
130. Id. at 959.
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stuff he was doing."131 Left without discussion are potential explanations
for why she tolerated the conduct for so long or why she may not have com-
plained more formally about his sexual inquiries. In ascertaining unwel-
comeness, both courts searched her conduct for a direct assertion of rights,
even when the facts indicated that relational concerns were guiding her
response to the situation. 132 While ostensibly a jury or other fact finder
could ultimately consider these facts to persuasively establish
unwelcomeness, the legal standards favoring a timely complaint encourage
the opposite conclusion.
B. HER REACTION TO THE HARASSER- WHY IS HE STILL WATCHING
HER DOG?
Another rule for interpreting the harassment victim's behavior governs
how a woman who does not welcome the conduct is expected to react to-
ward her harasser. A guiding principle has developed indicating that if the
conduct actually is unwelcome, the way in which a plaintiff responds to the
harasser will be overtly negative and confrontational.133 The expectation is
that she will sever ties with the harasser and treat him contemptuously. Pre-
serving even minor social conventions and arrangements with the harasser,
such as accepting pet care, weigh toward a finding that sexual conduct was
welcome.134 This precedent reinforces assumptions that behavior such as
smoothing over the situation by ignoring it, maintaining some type of rela-
tionship with the harasser, or joking about what happened indicate that con-
duct was welcome. 135 Thus, sexual harassment law may consider silence as
an invitation to proceed. 136
131. Id. at 958-59.
132. See Morgan, supra note 86, at 86-87 (showing that in a study of 31 female sexual
harassment plaintiffs, more often than not, the decision to litigate was often made with impact on
personal relationships as central concern).
133. See, e.g., Kouri v. Liberian Servs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-00582-A, 1991 WL 50003, 55
Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 125, 127-28 (E.D. Va. Feb. 6, 1991) (demonstrating a sexual harassment
case where continual requests that supervisor stop touching plaintiff and plaintiff's efforts to avoid
his hugs were deemed insufficiently serious or forceful to indicate unwelcomeness, in part be-
cause plaintiff had shared personal problems with her boss and had written notes thanking him for
his friendship).
134. See, e.g., Ripley v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., No. 04AP-313, 2004 WL
2361571, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2005) (finding that harassment was welcome in part
because a plaintiff accepted gifts from her harasser and had him care for her dog).
135. Women who decide to ignore inappropriate overtures or who use humor to subtly reject
the harasser while downplaying the situation are much more likely to be perceived as welcoming
the behavior. See generally Jeanne Henry & Julian Meltzoff, Perceptions of Sexual Harassment
as a Function of Target's Response Type and Observer's Sex, 39 SEX ROLES 253, 255-56 (1998)
(stating that the most common response of women experiencing sexual harassment was ignoring
it). In fact, not responding at all was perceived as less welcoming than passively deflecting the
conduct by joking. Id. Somewhat assertive responses that fall short of actual confrontation, such
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Again, the behaviors defined by law as evidence of unwelcomeness
conflict with how women tend to behave. Research shows that women are
more likely to tolerate or avoid their harassers than they are to confront
them directly. 137 Women tend to use less assertive responses to handle the
harassment without disrupting work routines or relationships.138 Rather
than force a direct confrontation, women attempt to manage it in such a way
that the harasser loses interest or otherwise recognizes his mistake in
judgment.139 Strategies that women develop to respond to sexually harass-
ing behavior most often involve ignoring the behavior and avoiding the
harasser. 140 Some harassed employees attempt to defuse the situation with
humor or by playing along, as though nothing untoward has occurred.1 41
Here again, conduct grounded in relational reasoning may explain the
disconnect between how women respond toward their harassers and how
the law expects them to respond in order to establish the harassment as
unwelcome. The law relies upon underlying assumptions favoring rights-
based behavior. Women are expected to assert their rights by standing up
to their harassers, or at least exhibiting indignation at the harasser's in-
fringement on their rights. This principle not only fails to acknowledge
how women actually behave, but disregards the extent to which women
may make decisions based on care, connection, and context.
The fact that women sometimes maintain relationships with their
harassers correlates with the ethic of care, in which women approach con-
flict with a "constant eye to maintaining relational order and connection." 42
A woman may conclude that protecting the relationship from additional,
as silently glaring at a harasser, also are less likely to be taken as unwelcoming. Id. at 256, 261-
62. The fact that these attitudes are found in society does not mean that the law should incor-
porate them.
136. See Stephen Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge In Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
2151, 2181 (1995) (noting that the laws governing rape have been criticized for characterizing
silence or indecision as evidence of consent; in contrast, a medical patient's silence or equivo-
cation is not deemed to constitute consent).
137. Gruber & Smith, supra note 105, at 544-46.
138. Id. at 547.
139. Id.
140. Marshall, supra note 104, at 105-06. These responses were identified within the context
of Marshall's study of employer's adversarial policies and practices concerning internal sexual
harassment grievances, either as experienced previously by the target of harassment or as under-
stood by her through information about the experiences of other employees. Id. at 99.
141. See Gruber & Smith, supra note 105, at 545 (stating that women try to defuse the situa-
tion by making a joke of it). One study showed that many harassed employees respond in indirect,
non-confrontational ways, such as by "ignoring the harasser (44%), avoiding the harasser (28%),
making a joke of the behavior (15%), or going along with the behavior (7%)." Marshall, supra
note 104, at 86 n. 1 (citing MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS AND CONTINUING CHALLENGES (1995)).
142. GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at xiv.
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overt conflict will have less of a negative impact on the web of connections
that makes up her life than would direct confrontation. 143 After assessing
her options in a sexually harassing situation, she may decide that her rela-
tionship with the harasser may be best preserved or even nudged toward
normalcy if she ignores the conduct and pretends that it does not bother
her.144 If she does tell the harasser she is not interested, she may do so
politely and indirectly, 145 or by making excuses. 146 A woman who operates
according to an ethic of care may decide that supportive relationships en-
able her, and dependent relationships require her to return to a workplace
where a harasser is still present. 147
Women who use relational reasoning may emphasize social context in
their decision-making 148 to the point that they adhere to stereotypical gen-
der roles, such as avoiding direct confrontation and expressions of anger.149
These women nurture relationships and emphasize cooperation over compe-
143. See Marshall, supra note 104, at 110-11 (providing that the existence of relational
reasoning is evident even when a woman does voice her objections directly to the harasser).
Women who do confront a harasser may be motivated not by a right to be free of workplace
harassment, but by a desire to protect the feelings of co-workers who also were uncomfortable
with the conduct and to alleviate problems with workplace efficiency caused by the harassment.
Id.
144. See Susan L. Miller & Sally S. Simpson, Courtship Violence and Social Control: Does
Gender Matter?, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 335, 340 (1991) (citing CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A
DIFFERENT VOICE 62 (Harvard University Press 1993) (1982)) (explaining that the tendency to
attempt to repair and maintain even morally problematic relationships has been connected to
women's tendency to prioritize relationships over other socially valuable assets).
145. See GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at 80 (identifying care for others and inhibited self-
expression in a woman who describes how, unlike her boyfriend, she never wants to hurt anyone
and so criticizes people "in a very nice way"). The use of hedges, super polite forms, and other
constructions that connote a lack of power have been defined as "women's language" and are
exhibited to varying degrees by women testifying in court. WILLIAM M. O'BARR, LINGUISTIC
EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POWER, AND STRATEGY IN THE COURTROOM 62-65 (1982) (citing
ROBIN LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND A WOMAN'S PLACE (1975)). O'Barr concluded that the ten-
dency of women to use these language forms is at least in part due to "the greater tendency of
women to occupy relatively powerless social positions." Id. at 70-71.
146. See Mangrum v. Republic Indus., Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1253 (N.D. Ga. 2003)
(stating that plaintiff sometimes told the defendant harasser "I'm busy," rather than an
unequivocal "no").
147. See Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 561 (8th Cir. 1992) (providing
an example where the plaintiff returned to work three times after leaving due to harassment
because a supervisor who seemed supportive had also returned and because she needed to support
herself, her father, and her brother).
148. See GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at 79 (discussing the second phase in women's moral
development, during which "moral judgment relies on shared norms and expectations. The
woman at this point validates her claim to social membership through the adoption of societal
values.").
149. Barbara A. Gutek & Bruce Morasch, Sex-Ratios, Sex-Role Spillover, and Sexual
Harassment of Women at Work, 38 J. OF SOCIAL ISSUES 55, 58-59 (1982). In an effort to gain or
maintain social acceptance, women fulfill the stereotypical female role. Id. See also Hoffmann,
supra note 108, at 56-57 (providing that women may have difficulty advocating for themselves
directly by confronting a harasser).
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tition and conflict because they perceive that society expects them to be-
have that way. Such female employees will follow societal expectations by
being more nurturing, sympathetic, loyal, or sexually attractive than men in
the same work environment, despite the harassment.150 Thus, relational
reasoning may result in adherence to perceived societal expectations for
women, such as preserving social decorum, refraining from making a scene,
and remaining loyal to the harasser or employer at their own expense.151
Adherence to sex roles may mask true feelings about the harassment,
resulting in behaviors that conflict with the rights-based assumption that a
woman would confront or sever ties with the harasser if the conduct were
unwelcome. 
152
In Kouri v. Liberian Services, Inc.,1 53 a woman working as a secretary
found herself being smothered by her boss's overly-affectionate and pro-
tective conduct, such as insisting on accompanying her whenever she left
the office, sending her complimentary notes, and frequently rubbing her
hands and back.'5 4 She tried to rebuff his advances gently and politely,
fulfilling her societal gender role by being loyal, sympathetic, and non-
confrontational.155 She also sought to reinforce her connection with her
husband, enlisting him for a series of planned exhibitions of marital unity
that were performed in front of her boss.156 However, the judge charac-
terized her behavior as "hopelessly indirect" and therefore welcoming of the
conduct. 5 7 The assumption was that if the conduct was unwelcome, the
plaintiff would have behaved toward her boss in a harsher, more confron-
tational manner, and since she didn't, the conduct was deemed not
unwelcome. 158
150. See Gutek & Morasch, supra note 149, at 58.
151. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
36, 39 (Harvard University Press 1987). Catharine MacKinnon goes even further by suggesting
that to the extent women use relational reasoning at all, they do so because they themselves are
defined by society in terms of their relation to men. Id.
152. See Gwartney-Gibbs & Lach, supra note 111, at 370 (discussing how Professor Anita
Hill "conformed to her gender role by not challenging her supervisor, by doing all she could to
avoid interpersonal conflict and confrontation, and by attempting to maintain a semblance of
normalcy in her social relations with Thomas").
153. Civ. A. No. 90-00582-A, 1991 WL 50003, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 125 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 6, 1991).
154. See Kouri, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases at 127-28.
155. See id. at 126, 129 (providing that the plaintiff unsuccessfully declined defendant's
offers of rides, unsuccessfully asked him not to follow her into her house, turned her body away
from his attempted kiss, and repeatedly asked him not to touch her).
156. Id. at 127, 129.
157. Id. at 129.
158. Id.
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Instead of engaging in direct confrontation, women who factor in the
impact of their actions on their web of relational connections may downplay
the conflict between harasser and harassee. Adherence to these perceived
societal expectations conflicts with the formalistic rules for establishing un-
welcomeness. When women make decisions on this basis, the law is likely
to deem them as having welcomed the harassment.
C. FUNGIBILITY AND ESCALATION-BUT I HEARD SHE TOLD A
DIRTY JOKE
The unwelcomeness requirement sides with rights-based reasoning
over relational reasoning by promoting an all-or-nothing rule concerning
women's sexuality, without regard for context. The focus on the plaintiff's
behavior and the requirement that a plaintiff establish the conduct as
unwelcome connotes that women are sexually available in the workplace,
absent affirmative proof to the contrary. 59 Plaintiffs must disprove the
universally applied assumption that they somehow incited or sanctioned the
harassment. 160 A woman who does not cover 161 her sexuality with some
co-workers may be assumed to welcome all types of sexual advances from
other co-workers unless she establishes otherwise. 162 Even sexual conduct
that the harasser only heard about from others and sexually-related conduct
that the woman engaged in outside of work can be asserted as constituting
solicitation that negates unwelcomeness.163 A woman who discusses her
159. See Chambers, supra note 1, at 747 (stating that the "possibility" of "some sex-based
workplace conduct may not cause harm which has led some courts to assume such conduct is
welcome until proven otherwise"); Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 97 (stating that "[b]urdening the
plaintiff with proving that the man's behavior was unwelcome assumes that any woman is
sexually available to any man, known or unknown-unless and until she can convince him (and
the court) otherwise").
160. See RHODE, supra note 5, at 102 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69
(1986)).
161. See Rachael Knight, From Hester Prynne to Crystal Chambers: Unwed Mothers,
Authentic Role Models, and Coerced Speech, 25 BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. L., 481, 488-89,
499-520 (2004) (discussing courts' unfavorable treatment of discrimination claims made by
women who refuse to "cover" (i.e., hide, minimize, or neutralize) the fact that they were un-
married and pregnant).
162. See, e.g., Beard v. Flying J Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 797-98 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that the
accused supervisor successfully argued that his conduct, touching of the plaintiff's breasts with
his body, cooking tongs, and with a pen, was not unwelcome, because the plaintiff was alleged to
have touched a male co-worker's thigh in a sexually suggestive way and to have frequently used
suggestive language at work).
163. See Homey v. Westfield Gage Co., 77 F. App'x 24, 28-30 n.l (lst Cir. 2003) (stating
that defendants could proffer evidence that plaintiff bared her breasts while working at a previous
job to show that vulgar sexual remarks made to her by her supervisor at a later place of
employment were not unwelcome); Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 565 (8th
Cir. 1992) (explaining that evidence that plaintiff had posed for nude photos outside of work was
relevant to determination of welcomeness). In 1994, Federal Rule of Evidence 412 was amended
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sex life with one co-worker may be argued to have lost the right to
complain about sexual inquiries from another co-worker.164 A woman who
openly engages in a sexual relationship with one co-worker may be
assumed to welcome a potential sexual relationship with any other co-
worker.165 A woman who collects sexual jokes and makes comments about
her breasts in a discussion with a female co-worker may be deemed to have
welcomed a male co-worker's propositions and vulgar remarks. 166
By facilitating these types of arguments as potential defenses to sexual
harassment claims, the unwelcomeness requirement supports the assump-
tion that female sexuality is fungible and fails to recognize the obvious
importance of context in sexual decision-making.167 Someone who engages
in relational reasoning will be particularly inclined to behave in a manner
that emphasizes context and relationships-acting in a sexually open
manner in one situation with certain persons, yet not welcoming sexual
content from other persons in other contexts. 168 Just as a woman may select
one person over others for a sexual relationship, some women may choose
to express a certain degree of sexuality in defined ways (clothing, jokes,
innuendo) or to certain persons in the workplace, using context, based upon
to provide some protection against the use of sexual history evidence, but the unwelcomeness
requirement still allows ample opportunity to intimidate plaintiffs through discovery procedures
and efforts to have such evidence admitted at trial. See Jane H. Aiken, Protecting Plaintiffs'
Sexual Pasts: Coping with Preconceptions Through Discretion, 51 EMORY L.J., 559, 575-76
(2002) (discussing the changes to Rule 412 and its effect in sexual harassment cases on the
unwelcomeness requirement).
164. See, e.g., King v. Town of Hanover, 959 F. Supp. 62, 66 (D. N.H. 1996) (explaining
that innuendo used by a plaintiff with co-workers was relevant to determining whether sexual
overtures from a supervisor were welcome); Gatzke v. Campbell, No. C9-97-507, 1997 WL
757383, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1997) (noting that the defendant argued that because
plaintiff had engaged in off-color humor with bar staff, overtures from her supervisor were not
unwelcome).
165. See, e.g., B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1105 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that
defendants offered evidence of plaintiff's sexual comments and behavior away from work with
other co-workers to establish welcomeness of harassment from a co-worker).
166. Ripley v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., No. 04AP-313, 2004 WL 2361571, at *1
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2004) (mentioning the effect of plaintiff's use of sexual jokes on
unwelcomeness).
167. See Chambers, supra note 1, at 747 n.69 (citing Benedet, supra note 58, at 140)
(arguing that investigation of woman's sexual history in harassment matters is founded on the idea
that "(s)exual acts are ... essentially fungible for women, both as to the partner with whom they
engage in them and as to the location in which they take place").
168. Studies of the sexual choices of adolescents have identified a significant difference
between male and female approaches to sexual choices: girls place more importance on the nature
of the interpersonal relationship and attachment involved. Kathleen Holland Bollerud et al., Girls'
Sexual Choices: Looking For What Is Right: The Intersection of Sexual and Moral Development,
in MAKING CONNECTIONS: THE RELATIONAL WORLDS OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS AT EMMA
WILLARD SCHOOL 274, 274 (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1990). This difference occurs at all levels
of sexuality. Id. Sexual decisions made from the attachment orientation exhibit the ethic of care,
with concern for connection and interdependence. Id. at 276.
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their relationships and perceptions about the social context of the
workplace. She may consider herself able to express her sexuality with
certain co-workers, while remaining uncomfortable with sexual colloquy or
conduct in the context of relationships with other co-workers or supervisors.
Women who emphasize relational reasoning also are likely to perceive the
exchange of somewhat personal information with certain co-workers as part
of establishing the bonds and connections that they value. The law, how-
ever, promotes the notion and provides the opportunity for defense counsel
to argue that any expression of sexuality constitutes inviting or encouraging
sexual conduct from all co-workers and supervisors.
A related precedent precludes a woman from establishing conduct as
unwelcome if she is deemed to have participated in it.169 Courts have held
that a woman cannot even raise a triable issue of fact as to unwelcomeness
when she is deemed to have participated in the complained of conduct.170
The problem is that the law too often tends to support the proposition that
any evidence of sexuality exhibited by a woman may constitute "partici-
pation" that welcomes even escalated sexual conduct and outright abuse.
When women engage in limited sexually-related conduct, even severe
escalations of the conduct can be deemed not unwelcome, such that mildly
suggestive joking can be argued to welcome obscene gestures, touching,
and abusive behavior.a71 Women who participate in sexual banter and
innuendo at work can be found to have welcomed being fondled, shoved,
and threatened with violence. 72 These holdings ignore the nuances of
169. See, e.g., Balletti v. Sun-Sentinel Co., 909 F. Supp. 1539, 1547 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (stating
that "[w]here a plaintiffs action in the work place shows that she was a willing and frequent
participant in the conduct at issue, courts are less likely to find that the conduct was
'unwelcome"').
170. See Scusa v. Nestle USA Co., 181 F.3d 958, 966 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that "[tihe
undisputed evidence showed that appellant engaged in behavior similar to that which she claimed
was unwelcome and offensive").
171. See Ripley, 2004 WL 2361571, at *1-2. (holding that a woman who engages in sexual
joking and conversation, publicly comments about her breasts, keeps a file of suggestive cartoons
and jokes, does not hide her sexual encounters, compares breast sizes with a female co-worker,
and one day does not wear a bra to work welcomed direct sexual advances from co-workers,
including suggestive looks accompanied by lip-licking, daily outright demands for sex, lifting her
skirt, and vulgar sexual gestures such as crotch-grabbing).
172. See, e.g., Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1563-64 (M.D. Fla.
1990) (holding that because she engaged in sexual banter, plaintiff was deemed to have welcomed
the actions of a co-worker who placed his penis in her hand); Mangrum v. Republic Indus., Inc.,
260 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1252-53 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (stating that plaintiff who engaged in vulgar
language, gave massages, and exchanged back scratches with co-workers is deemed to have
welcomed supervisor's repeated requests for sex and patting her behind); Reed v. Shepard, 939
F.2d 484, 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that a plaintiff who told dirty jokes, made sexual
comments, showed off her abdominal scars, went braless, and gave suggestive gifts to her
colleagues was found to have welcomed being punched in the kidneys, tickled, handcuffed to
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context, which have particular significance in affecting the behavior of
women who rely upon relational reasoning. 73
V. INVITING THE ETHIC OF CARE
Feminist scholars have long criticized the law's structural bias against
women within seemingly neutral standards.17 4 Recognizing the chasm be-
tween the formal legal equality promised by our system and the inequality
experienced by women in their lives, feminist legal theory examines the
ways in which the law contributes to women's subordination "by masking
gendered norms as neutral and entrenching the status quo."' 175 This inquiry
has concluded that the law's gender bias is no accident, but is central to the
development of the law itself.176 Likewise, the supposedly objective stan-
dards developed to analyze sex discrimination have been attacked for
lacking context 177 and for making "maleness the norm of what is human ...
all in the name of neutrality." 178
various objects in the office, forced to put her head in the laps of male co-workers, mocked with
an electric cattle prod, dunked into a toilet, and maced).
173. Not all cases advance the assumption that participating in some sexual conduct wel-
comes escalated conduct. See, e.g., Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987)
("Plaintiff's use of foul language or sexual innuendo in a consensual setting does not waive her
legal protections against unwelcome harassment."); Rahn v. Junction City Foundry, Inc., 152 F.
Supp. 2d 1249, 1257 (D. Kan. 2001) (declining to hold that laughing at dirty jokes established that
harassment was not unwelcome as a matter of law).
174. See, e.g., Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63
TEX. L. REv. 387, 400-01 (1984) (citing Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and
the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC'Y 635, 655
(1983); GILLIGAN, supra note 14, at 8).
175. Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 32, at 120 (citing MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION
TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 15 (1999)). See also Patricia Peppin, Power and Disadvantage in
Medical Relationships, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 221, 249 (1994) (citing SUSAN MOLLER OKIN,
JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 10-13 (1989)). Peppin argues that scientific knowledge and,
as a result, medical care, is "constructed in ways that are biased against some or all members of
disadvantaged groups," and notes that applying legal standards does not improve the dilemma,
since the legal system also is built upon biases underlying asserted neutrality. Id. at 247. The
touchstone of "reasonableness" has been exposed as judicially created, biased toward white male,
middle-class, able-bodied norms, and following the perceived distinction between reason and
emotion. Id. at 249.
176. Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 32, at 120 (citing MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION
TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 2 (1999)). See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 114-16, 136-37, 140
(1979) (criticizing the "differences" approach to analyzing sex discrimination).
177. For example, it has been argued that an individualized standard, rather than the
reasonable person test, should be used to determine whether conduct is sufficiently severe and
pervasive so as to create a hostile work environment, so that, among other things, gender
stereotypes about the appropriateness of the victim's conduct are less likely to be emphasized or
reinforced. Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the
Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151, 152-53 (1994); see also RHODE, supra note 5, at
106 (promoting context-specific reasonable person standard that was proposed and then
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To the extent that more women than men employ relational reasoning,
women's realities are distanced from the expectations of the law at a funda-
mental level. The foundation of modern legal theory embraces the hier-
archical ("male") perspective by defining people as distinct individuals who
act separately from one another.179 Women who view themselves as acting
within a web of connections with others often do not find their perceptions
reflected in the laws that govern their lives.
The legal standards used in assessing unwelcomeness are vulnerable to
similar charges of structural bias against women. Requiring a sexual ha-
rassment plaintiff to establish that the conduct she complains about was
unwelcome may seem to be a neutral standard,80 merely filtering out
claims based on sexual conduct that the complainant herself solicited or
invited.' 8 1 However, because the unwelcomeness element imposes stan-
dards that expect rights-based decision-making, those plaintiffs who make
decisions based on an ethic of care are placed at a disadvantage when at-
tempting to establish that conduct was unwelcome to them.
For women who rely upon relational reasoning, the structure of the
analysis conflicts with their process of making moral judgments and mis-
interprets their decision-making. The concepts framing the unwelcomeness
inquiry expect harassment victims to navigate difficult professional and
personal conflicts using an ethic of justice, not an ethic of care. If the
harassment is unwelcome, the victim's behavior assumedly will reflect a
formal right to work in an environment free of harassment, without ad-
justing to the context of the particular situation. The victim of harassment
is expected to act as though her notion of personal rights has been offended
by complaining without delay and without downplaying the conflict.
Precedent weighs against finding unwelcome conduct in instances where
plaintiff delays or refrains from complaining or attempts to maintain the
withdrawn by the EEOC (58 Fed. Reg. 51, 266-69 (Oct. 1, 1993), withdrawn, 59 Fed. Reg. 51,396
(Oct. 11, 1994))).
178. Scales, supra note 91, at 1377 (citing Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 140-42 (1872)
(Bradley, J., concurring) (asserting that for legal and "natural" reasons, women belong in a
separate sphere from men and approved the denial of bar membership based on gender)).
179. West, Jurisprudence, supra note 18, at 2.
180. See Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, in Practice and Theory: A Response to
Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217, 217 (1993) (discussing white privilege in
the context of sex discrimination and stating that "[d]ominance and privilege tend to seem normal
and neutral to the privileged").
181. The myth of the prevalence of false sexual harassment claims continues to live on,
despite data indicating that plaintiffs rarely make baseless complaints. See Oliveros, supra note
15, at 1392 (citing a study indicating that less than one percent of all sexual harassment
complaints made each year are false).
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benefits of a positive relationship despite the existence of harassment.182
Where women act in accordance with their context-driven moral judgment
to protect relationships, maintain social roles, and express sexuality within
self-drawn boundaries, legal precedent supports an interpretation of
welcomeness.
A substantial body of sociological research indicates that women typi-
cally do not respond to sexual harassment by overtly asserting their legal or
moral rights. 183 Both social science and the factual assertions contained in
reported decisions indicate that many women navigate their lives with rela-
tional reasoning. Because rights-based assumptions are ensconced in prece-
dent, the analysis for unwelcome conduct weighs against their chances of
establishing sexual harassment claims. As a consequence, women who use
relational reasoning in making decisions about how to behave risk being
deemed to have welcomed the harassment. Until the legal standards rec-
ognize the validity of moral judgments and behavior based upon an ethic of
care, 184 women will be unfairly disadvantaged when they attempt to
establish that sexual conduct at work was unwelcome to them. The re-
sulting preclusion of legitimate sexual harassment claims hinders the
elimination of gender bias, both in the workplace and in the legal system as
a whole.
182. See, e.g., Paraohao v. Bankers Club, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
(rejecting plaintiff's claim that conduct was unwelcome, in part because she waited several
months to complain and then did so only informally to a co-worker). No credence was allotted to
the fact that plaintiff enjoyed working in the accounting department and wanted to move into a
fulltime job in that department; that her other options with this employer appeared to be serving
and hostessing; that she needed the job for financial reasons; and that she also had hoped to
improve her financial situation through other business dealings with the harasser, with whom she
believed she had begun a financially lucrative corporation. Id. at 1359-60.
183. See Gruber & Smith, supra note 105, at 544 (discussing "clear evidence that women
generally give fairly nonassertive responses to their harassers").
184. See RHODE, supra note 5, at viii ("What most women seek is not simply equal access to
opportunities traditionally reserved for men, but equal recognition of the concerns and values
traditionally associated with women.").
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